INTRODUCTION
In a valuation-based system [Shenoy 1989 [Shenoy , 1992a , we represent knowledge by functions called valuations. We draw inferences from such systems using two operations called combination and marginalization. Combination corresponds to the aggregation of knowledge and marginalization corresponds to the coarsening of knowledge. Drawing inferences can be described simply as marginalizing all variables out of the joint valuation, which is the result of combining all the valuations.
A valuation-based system is expressive to represent Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [Shenoy 1994c ], Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs [Shenoy 1991a ], possibility theory [Dubois and Prade 1990, Shenoy 1992c] , propositional logic [Shenoy 1990 [Shenoy , 1994b , discrete optimization [Shenoy 1991b] , constraint satisfaction problems [Shenoy and Shafer 1988] , and Bayesian decision problems [Shenoy 1992b [Shenoy , 1993 . Its solution to Bayesian decision problems is a hybrid of the local computation method for belief networks [Shenoy and Shafer 1990 ] and the local computation method for discrete optimization [Bertele and Brioschi 1972, Shenoy 1991b] .
A graphical depiction of a valuation-based system is called a valuation network. Valuation networks are similar in some respects to influence diagrams. Like influence diagrams, valuation networks are a compact representation emphasizing qualitative features of decision problems. However, there are some differences. Whereas influence diagrams emphasize a factorization of the joint probability distribution into conditionals, valuation networks emphasize arbitrary fac-torizations of joint probability distributions. While conditional probabilities are readily available in pure causal models, they are not always readily available in other graphical models [e.g., Darroch, Lauritzen and Speed 1980] . The representation method of valuation-based systems is more general in this respect. Another minor difference is that the solution method for valuation-based systems involves minimal divisions and slightly improves the efficiency of computation [Shenoy 1994a ]. Both influence diagrams and valuation networks compactly represent the probabilistic dependence among the variables in a domain. However, unlike a decision tree, they fail to efficiently capture asymmetric dependencies between events and acts. Such asymmetric dependencies are often represented by creating dummy events and acts, and degenerate probabilities and utilities. In some highly asymmetric problems, such artifacts constitute a major portion of problem inputs and cause unnecessary computation. More importantly, they are artificial constructs and hinder effective communication between analysts and decision makers. Asymmetry can be viewed as an unbalanced dependence among events and acts. From this viewpoint, a problem is asymmetric if it has a decision tree representation that is unbalanced, i.e., not all scenarios contain the same sequence of acts and events. Therefore, to represent asymmetry, one has to capture the event/act dependence. Based on this idea, several methods have been proposed for representing and solving asymmetric decision problems. For example, Call and Miller [1990] describe a decision problem using separate decision tree and influence diagram representations. Fung and Shachter [1990] and Qi et al. [1994] describe an adaptation of influence diagrams to account for asymmetric scenarios. Smith et al. [1993] describe a decision problem using an influence diagram and several conditional distribution trees, where each represents a part of the event/act dependence. Covaliu and Oliver [1995] represent a decision problem using an influence diagram to represent probabilistic dependence and use a so-called sequential decision diagram to represent the event/act dependence. Shenoy [2000] proposes a new type of valuations called indicator valuations to represent the event/act dependence. Based on the event/act dependence, Liu and Shenoy [1995b] decompose an asymmetric problem into several symmetric sub-problems, and use a symmetric valuation network to represent each of the symmetric sub-problems. Demirer and Shenoy [2000] have proposed a new representation called sequential valuation networks that is a hybrid of Covaliu and Oliver's [1995] sequential decision diagrams and Shenoy's [1992b] symmetric valuation networks. Nielsen and Jensen [2000] describe a new representation called asymmetric influence diagrams that is also a hybrid of influence diagram and sequential decision diagrams. Finally, Bielza and Shenoy [1999] compare decision trees, Smith et al.'s [1993] influence diagrams, Covaliu and Oliver's [1995] sequential decision diagrams, and Shenoy's [2000] asymmetric valuation networks. This paper extends the framework of valuation-based systems to represent Bayesian asymmetric decision problems using a belief function-like calculus, called coarse valuations. The calculus admits incomplete specifications of probabilities such as a vacuous belief for a state space and a non-additive probability for a subset of the state space. The notion of coarse valuations provides a natural and compact way of representing asymmetric decision problems. It reduces the need for artificial events and acts, and degenerate probabilities and utilities. It captures both structural asymmetry and numerical coalescence at the functional level so that the graphical representation of an asymmetric problem is as compact as that of a symmetric one.
An outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a complete statement of the used car buyer's problem. In Section 3, we illustrate the nature of asymmetric problems and describe a valuation network representation using coarse valuations. In Section 4, we define three basic operations for coarse valuations. In Section 5, we present a fusion algorithm to solve coarse valuation networks. In Section 6, we discuss a few computational issues using the fusion algorithm. In Section 7, we illustrate the fusion algorithm by solving the used car buyer's problem. Finally, in Section 8, we make some concluding remarks.
THE USED CAR BUYER'S PROBLEM
The used car buyer's problem is described and solved by Howard [1962] as an illustration of the decision tree approach. Smith et al. [1993] , Qi et al. [1994] , and Shenoy [2000] use it as an example of a highly asymmetric decision problem.
Joe is considering buying a three-year-old Spartan sedan at a price of $1,000. The going rate for a similar car in the used car market is $1,100. Joe is unsure whether the car is a "lemon" or a "peach." Of the ten major mechanical systems in the car, a peach has only one defective system, while a lemon has defects in six of the ten systems. From historical data, 20% of Spartan cars were lemons and the other 80% were peaches. The cost of repairing one defect is $40 and the cost of repairing six defects is $200. For an additional $60, Joe can buy the car from the dealer with an anti-lemon guarantee. The anti-lemon guarantee will normally pay for 50% of the repair cost, but if the car is a lemon, it will pay the full repair cost of $200.
The dealer gives Joe an hour to have the car examined by a mechanic. The mechanic suggests three alternative diagnostic tests-steering, transmission, fuel & electrical-to determine the car's condition. All tests are able to detect the defects (if any) of their testing systems. The steering test costs $9, the transmission test costs $10, and the fuel and electrical test costs $13. After reviewing the result of transmission test, for an additional $4, Joe can proceed to have the differential system also tested.
A complete decision tree representation and solution for this problem can be found in [Howard 1962] . The optimal strategy is to do the fuel and electrical test; if both systems are non-defective then buy with no anti-lemon guarantee, else buy with anti-lemon guarantee. The maximum expected payoff is $32.89.
REPRESENTATION
A coarse valuation network is a graphical depiction of a valuation-based system in which both uncertainties and payoffs are expressed as set-to-point mappings. It uses decision variables, random variables, coarse payoff valuations, coarse probability valuations, and precedence constraints. We will discuss each of these in detail. Figure 1 shows a coarse valuation network representation for the used car buyer's problem. We use a random variable to represent an uncertainty. We use the symbol Ω R to denote the set of all possible values for random variable R. We assume that one and only one of the elements of Ω R is the true value of R. We call Ω R the state space for R. We represent a random variable in a valuation network by an elliptical-shaped node.
In the used car buyer's problem, there are three random variables: the result of the first test O, the result of the differential test R, and the car's condition C. The state space for O has three elements: 0 defect, 1 defect, and 2 defects. The state space for R has two elements: defective (0) and non-defective (1). The state space for C has two elements: peach (c p ) and lemon (c l ).
Coarse Payoff Valuations
For any finite set of variables X, let Ω X denote its state space. Let x denote a state in Ω X and x a subset of values in Ω X .
A coarse payoff valuation is a set to point mapping. Suppose π is a payoff valuation for X.
Then π(x) measures the payoff to the decision maker if x ∈ x. The values of a payoff valuation are consequences, for example, utilities and profits.
In a valuation network, we use a diamond to represent a payoff valuation. To permit the identification of all variables in its domain, we draw undirected edges between a payoff valuation node and all the variable nodes in its domain. In the used car buyer's problem, the payoff valuations π, ρ, and σ are shown in Figure 1 and are numerically specified in Table 1 . The specifications are self-explanatory except for σ(b 0 , Ω C ) = 0, which means that, if the decision B is not to buy the car, the payoff σ = 0 regardless of the car's condition (C). In other words, given B = b 0 , σ is independent of C. Note that σ is not totally independent of C. For example, if B = b 1 , then σ is dependent on C. To represent such an asymmetric event/act dependency, in a valuation network or an influence diagram using Bayesian probabilities, σ(b 0 , Ω C ) = 0 would have to be specified as σ(b 0 , c p ) = 0 and σ(b 0 , c l ) = 0. Asymmetry in payoff valuations is common in decision problems: the payoff of not marketing a product is independent of the market condition; the payoff of not drilling a well is independent of whether the hole has oil or not; the payoff for a 3-year bank certificate of deposit is independent of stock market conditions, macro economic conditions, and government controls. In general, assume π is a payoff valuation for X. If there exist a subset x such that for any values x ∈ x, π(x) is a constant k, then we coalesce them into one specification: π(x) = k. This representation of payoff valuations applies to the special case when x is a singleton or an entire state space.
For each payoff valuation, we have a requirement. Suppose π is a payoff valuation for X. This requirement can be stated as follows. For any x ∈ Ω X , there exists one and only one subset x such that x ∈ x and π(x) is specified. We call this requirement the payoff completeness. This condition stipulates that there be one payoff value assigned to every point x in Ω X .
Coarse Probability Valuations
In a coarse valuation network, uncertainties are represented by coarse probability valuations. Similar to a coarse payoff valuation, a coarse probability valuation is a real-valued mapping. Let H and T be two disjoint sets of variables. Suppose α is a probability valuation for H given T.
Then α(h | t) measures the probability that H ∈ h given T ∈ t.
Coarse probabilities have the flavor of conditional belief functions [Liu and Shenoy 1998 ]. Mathematically, a coarse probability valuation must satisfy a set of axioms (see Appendix) similar to that for Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [Shafer 1976 ]. Semantically, the assignment of coarse probabilities follows the notion of evidential support [Shafer 1976 ]; we assign a positive probability to (h | t) if there is a piece of evidence that partially supports (h | t). We call an assertion (h | t) focal if α(h | t) > 0. Correspondingly, we call h the focal head and t the focal tail.
The notion of coarse probabilities has three non-trivial special cases. First, if every focal head
is Ω H , then α is a vacuous probability function of H given T. Second, if every focal tail is Ω T , then our knowledge about H is irrelevant to that about T. α is a Dempster-Shafer basic probability assignment function for H. Finally, if every focal head and focal tail is a singleton, then α is a Bayesian conditional probability distribution function. In a coarse valuation network, we use a triangular node to represent a coarse probability valuation. Suppose α is a conditional probability valuation of H given T. To permit the identification of variables, we draw a directed edge pointing to each variable in H and an undirected edge to each variable in T from the α node. In the used car buyer's problem, there are three coarse valuations α, β, and γ as shown in Figure 1 , where α is a conditional probability valuation of O given {T, C}, β is a conditional probability valuation of R given {T, O, D, C}, and γ is a marginal probability valuation for C.
The three probability valuations are numerically specified in Table 2 . Following the convention of Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter [1988] , we write the coarse probability valuations using the potential form. For example,
In addition, as in belief functions, a coarse probability valuation is only specified for its focal elements. Therefore, a table of coarse probability valuations has no zero values, as illustrated by Table 2 . Table 2 is self-evident. For example, γ({c p }) = 0.8 and γ({c l }) = 0.2 represent the statistics that 20% of Spartan cars are lemons. Note that a differential test is conducted only when the transmission test is initially chosen. Since a peach has one defective system, there will be a 1/9 chance that the differential system is bad if the initial transmission test does not spot any defect. On the other hand, the probability vanishes if the transmission test fails. Therefore, we have
Much of
, and β(t 3 , 1, d 1 , 0, c p ) = 1.0. The last four specifications of β in Table 2 can be interpreted in a similar manner. The first value of β, i.e.,
.0, needs some explanations. Note that if no differential system test (d 0 ) is conducted, there will be no differential test results. In the parlance of belief functions, we have a vacuous belief about the differential test result (R) given non-differential system test (d 0 ). Therefore, the whole state space of R, Ω R , is a focal element and takes the whole belief mass. In addition, given no differential test, D = d 0 , our knowledge about the test results is irrelevant to that about the initial test (T), the initial test result (O), and the car's condition (C). In other words, the above vacuous belief function is independent of T, O, and C given d 0 . Therefore, we have a basic probability assignment
It is interesting to note how a symmetric influence diagram represents the same uncertainties.
First we need to create an artificial state "no result" (nr) for both O and R. Then, the above
0 would have to be replaced by 96 degenerate probabilities as follows:
for any t ∈ Ω T , o ∈ {nr, 0, 1, 2}, and c ∈ Ω C . In addition, because of the introduction of the artificial state nr, we need to specify β(t, o, d 1 , 0, c) = 0 for o ∈ {nr, 0, 1, 2} and c ∈ Ω C . Furthermore, for t ∈ {t 0 , t 1 , t 2 }, there will be no differential test to follow. To make β complete, we need to add 72 more numerical specifications as
r ∈ {nr, 0, 1}, and c ∈ {c p , c l }. In total, we need 192 specifications for the valuation β to be completely specified. Compared with the 8 specifications in Table 2 , a symmetric influence dia-
gram demands a lot of extra work in representing an asymmetric decision problem. Even worse is that many of the extra specifications are artificially created for the purpose of fitting in the model and carry neither useful data for computation nor semantic meaning to a decision maker. The coarse probability valuation α in Table 2 represents the conditional probability of the test result O given the initial test T and the car's condition C. Of ten major systems, a peach has only one defective system. Thus, if the electric system is bad, the fuel system will not and vice versa. Thus, if the fuel and electric test t 2 is done, there are two possible test results: neither the fuel nor the electric system is bad (O = 0), either the fuel or the electric system is bad (O = 1). By doing little analysis, we have α(t 2 , 0, c p ) = 0.8 and α(t 2 , 0, c p ) = 0.2. On the other hand, a lemon can have up to six defective systems. If the fuel and electric test (t 2 ) is done, there are three possible test results: neither the fuel nor the electric system is bad (O = 0), either the fuel or the electric system is bad (O = 1), or both are bad (O = 2). Thus, we have the last three specifications of α in Table 2 (hypergeometric distribution with N = 10, p = 0.6, n = 2).
If no initial test is done (t 0 ), one is ignorant about the test result and the belief is independent of the car's condition. Therefore, we have
If we do the steering test (t 1 ) or the transmission test (t 3 ), the probability of finding zero defects is 0.9 given that the car is a peach (c p ). Therefore, we have α(t 1 , 0, c p ) = 0.9 and α(t 3 , 0, c p ) = 0.9. They can be coalesced into one specification α({t 1 , t 3 }×{0}×{c p }) = 0.9, which means that our belief about the assertion ({0}|{t 1 , t 3 }×{c p }) is 0.9 according to the notion of coarse probability valuations. Similarly, we can obtain the remaining specifications of α in Table 2 . If α is specified as a Bayesian probability function, we would have to first create an artificial state "no result" (nr) for O and then specify 40 numerical values; among them 26 are degenerate probabilities.
In sum, the coarse valuation network is very expressive and compact in representing asymmetric decision problems. First of all, it does not need to create any artificial states or acts such as "no result" if no test is done. Second, it eliminates all zero probabilities from further manipulations. Third, two or more numerical specifications may be coalesced into one as we did for the payoff valuation σ in Table 1 and the valuation α in Table 2 . For example, by representing the above α, β, and γ as coarse probabilities, the valuation network can successfully avoid most of the degenerate probabilities and all the artificial states.
Like payoff valuations, probability valuations must satisfy certain conditions to permit a solution to a coarse valuation network. First, for each random variable R, there exists at least one conditional probability function of H given T such that R ∈ H. We call this requirement the belief completeness condition. Second, assume α 1 is a conditional probability function of H 1 given T 1 and α 2 is of H 2 given T 2 . Then at most one of the intersections T 1 ∩ H 2 and H 1 ∩ T 2 is nonempty. In addition, the following properties hold for every pair of focal elements (h 1 | t 1 ) and (h 2 | t 2 ),
where h j ↓T i ∩Η j and t i ↓T i ∩H j are respectively the projections of h j and t i to T i ∩ H j . In general, if
(1) We call this requirement the compatibility condition. Finally, suppose π is a payoff valuation for X and α is a conditional belief function of H given T such that X ∩ H ≠ ∅. Then for every focal element of α, (h | t), there exists a subset x, on which π is specified, such that
We call the last requirement the expectability condition.
The belief completeness condition is easy to understand and can be easily satisfied by adding one or more vacuous probability functions. On the compatibility condition, if both T 1 ∩ H 2 and H 1 ∩ T 2 are non-empty, then we will have a cycle of two probability functions: one is of T 1 ∩ H 2 given H 1 ∩ T 2 and the other H 1 ∩ T 2 given T 1 ∩ H 2 . A valuation network is essentially a directed chain graph. Any cycle of probability functions is not allowed. The second part of compatibility is concerned with the inferability of two logical assertions. If T 1 ∩ H 2 ≠ φ, to make an inference based on the chain t 2 ⇒ h 2 and t 1 ⇒ h 1 , we naturally need the conclusion of the first statement be more specific than the condition of the second statement. One can similarly interpret the second equation when T 2 ∩ H 1 ≠ ∅. The expectability condition stipulates the condition, under which we can multiply a coarse payoff valuation with a coarse probability valuation. Without it, we cannot apply expectation operations on the variables in X ∩ H.
Precedence Constraints
Besides variables, beliefs and payoffs, an important ingredient of the problem representation is information constraints. Some decisions have to be made before the observation of some uncertain events, and other decisions can be postponed until after some events are observed. In the used car buyer's problem, for example, the car's condition is revealed only after we purchase the car or perhaps never revealed. And the decision whether to buy the car or not may be postponed until the test result is revealed. If a decision maker expects to be informed of the true value of random variable R before he makes a decision D, then we represent this situation by the binary relation R → D (read as R precedes D). On the other hand, if a random variable R is only revealed after a decision D is made or perhaps never revealed, then we represent this situation by the binary relation D → R. It is possible that in some problems, we may have precedence constraints between two decision nodes or between two random variable nodes. For example, if random variable R 2 is only revealed after random variable R 1 is revealed, we represent this by the relation R 1 → R 2 .
In the used car buyer's problem, we have the precedence constraints A problem can be incorrectly over-constrained permitting no solution. For example, if D → R and R → D, then this will preclude a solution. Therefore, we do not permit such precedence constraints. What restrictions do we need to impose on the precedence relation →? We require three conditions. First, we require that the transitive closure of →, denoted by >, is a partial order. We call this first condition the partial order condition. Second, we require that this partial order > is such that for any decision variable D and any random variable R, either D > R or R > D. We call this second condition the perfect recall condition. Third, if there exists a conditional probability function of H given T, which contains a decision variable D, and D is minimum in H ∪ T, then we require that the probability function is independent of D. We call this third condition the semantic condition. Before we explain the reasons for these three conditions, we need the notions of transitive closure and partial ordering:
The transitive closure of → is defined as follows:
• X > Y whenever X → Y, and • X > Y whenever there exists a variable Z such that X > Z and Z > Y.
A binary relation > is a partial order if it is irreflexive and transitive. The reason for the partial order requirement is obvious. The reason for the perfect recall condition is as follows. Given the meaning of the precedence relation →, for any decision variable D and any random variable R, either R is known when decision D has to be made, or not. This translates to either R > D or D > R. Finally, the semantic condition is dictated by the meaning that a probability function measures the degrees of beliefs about uncertain propositions.
THE BASIC OPERATIONS
This section introduces three basic operations over coarse payoffs and coarse probabilities: combination, marginalization, and division.
Combination. In this paper we assume the payoff valuations to be additive. Suppose π is a payoff valuation of X and σ is a payoff valuation of Y. Their combination, denoted by π ⊗ σ or σ ⊗ π, is a payoff valuation of Z = X ∪ Y defined as follows:
(2) where z ↓X = x and z ↓Y = y. Note that Equation 2 is well defined in the sense that, for every nonempty subset z ⊂ Ω Z , there cannot be two or more pairs of subsets (x, y) such that z ↓X = x, and z ↓Y = y. Otherwise, one can verify that it violates the payoff completeness condition.
Suppose π is a payoff valuation of X and α is a probability valuation bearing on Y. Their combination, denoted by π ⊗ α or α ⊗ π, is a payoff valuation of Z = X ∪ Y defined as follows:
where z ↓X = x and z ↓Y = y. Because of the belief completeness condition and the expectability condition, Equation 3 is well defined. Suppose α and β are two compatible probability valuations respectively defined on X and Y.
Their combination, denoted by α ⊗ β or β ⊗ α, is a probability valuation defined on Z = X ∪ Y as follows:
One can prove that Equation 4 generalizes both Dempster's rule of combination and Bayesian rule of conditioning. If α and β are both Dempster-Shafer belief functions, Equation 4 is the same as Dempster's rule except for normalization. On the other hand, assume that the heads of α and β are disjoint as for Bayesian probabilities. Because of the compatibility of α and β, there exists a unique pair of focal elements (x, y) that satisfies z ↓X = x and z ↓Y = y for z ⊂ Ω Z . Then, Equation 4 can be reduced into the following (α ⊗ β)(z) = α(x)β(y) (5) where z ↓X = x and z ↓Y = y.
Equation 2 basically assumes the additive decomposition of a multi-attribute utility function [Keeney and Raiffa 1976] . Equation 3 computes expected utilities, and therefore, assumes a normative preference structure when making choices under uncertainty [Liu and Shenoy 1995a] . Equation 4 is consistent with Dempster's rule of combination when combining marginal belief functions and the Bayesian rule of conditioning when combining conditional probability functions. Table 3 . Computation of α ⊗ β Table 3 illustrates the combination of α and β. Since every random variable belongs to the head of one and only one conditional probability valuation, Equation 5 is applicable to the above combinations. In other words, the combination of α and β is obtained by simply intersecting their focal elements and multiplying their corresponding probabilities. Table 4 further shows the combination of α ⊗ β and γ. Note that the combination of coarse probability valuations is associative and commutative. The order of combining them does not matter and (α ⊗ β) ⊗ γ can be equivalently written as α ⊗ β ⊗ γ.
{T, O, D, R, C}
Marginalization. Marginalization means projecting a valuation to its partial domains. Depending on the type of variable being reduced, the definition of marginalization and the methods of projection are different. When a decision variable D is to be eliminated from a payoff valuation, marginalization corresponds to the maximization of the payoff valuation by selecting a subset from Ω D for D. Precisely, assume π is a payoff valuation of X and D ∈ X. The marginal of π for Y = X -{D}, denoted by π ↓Y , is a payoff valuation for Y defined as follows:
Equation 6 represents a decision tree solution process called "folding back." It assumes that the decision-maker wants to maximize the payoff valuation. This is true if the payoff values represent utility, profits, probability of success, etc. On the other hand, if the decision-maker wishes to minimize the payoff values such as disutility, cost, and probability of failure, then we need to substitute min for max in Equation 6. Assume α is a probability valuation defined on X and is independent of D. To marginalize D out of α is to simply drop D out of X. Formally, the marginal of α for Y = X -{D}, denoted by α ↓Y , is a conditional probability function for Y defined as follows:
where y ⊂ x ↓Y (7) As we will see shortly, we always marginalize a minimal variable out of a valuation. Therefore, according to the semantic condition, a probability valuation must be independent of D if it is to be eliminated. Table 8 in Section 7 shows how η = θ ↓{T, O} is obtained from θ in Table 7 .
When a chance variable is to be reduced, marginalization corresponds to the summation of a valuation over all the values of the chance variable. When the valuation is a probability valuation, the summation is simply the familiar marginalization operation in probability theory and Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions [Kong 1986 ]. When the valuation is a payoff function, the summation represents a similar operation called "averaging out" in solving a decision tree.
Mathematically, assume π is a payoff valuation of X containing the chance variable R. The marginal of π for Y = X -{R}, denoted by π ↓Y , is a payoff valuation for Y defined as follows:
Assume α is a conditional probability function of H given T and H contains a chance variable
The column δ in Table 4 shows the marginalization of α⊗β⊗γ, which is a conditional probability valuation of {O, R, C} given {T, D}, to {T, O, D, R}.
Division. Operationally, division is opposite to combination. Let α be a probability valuation for X and Y ⊂ X. Then we define α/α ↓Y , called α divided by α ↓Y , to be a probability valuation for X as follows:
(10) Because α is positive for all focal elements, both α and α ↓Y will be positive. Thus, the division in Equation 10 is always well defined. The last column in Table 4 shows the division of (α⊗β⊗γ) by (α⊗β⊗γ) ↓{T, O, D, R} . Note that divisions are critical to the recovery of conditional probabilities when doing arc reversals in an influence diagram. However, due to the fusion algorithm [Shenoy 1992b ], the division becomes less important in a valuation network. As we will see shortly, if a valuation network has only one payoff valuation as assumed by influence diagrams, the division is no longer necessary.
THE FUSION ALGORITHM
The basic idea of solving a valuation network is to delete all the variables one by one out of the joint coarse valuation. For problems with a few variables, it is feasible that we combine all the payoff and probability valuations into one joint payoff valuation and then marginalize it by eliminating the variables. However, for a problem with a large number of variables, this global computation approach is not feasible. As an alternative, the fusion algorithm, based on the idea of local computation, arranges the deletion process locally. The deletion sequence is in accordance with the precedence constraints in the sense a minimal variable is to be deleted first. Each step involves the fusion of a few valuations that bear on the variable to be deleted. In this section, we describe the fusion algorithm for solving valuation networks using coarse valuations.
Suppose a valuation network has n payoff valuations π 1 , π 2 ,..., π n and m probability valuations α 1 , α 2 ,..., α m , where π i 's domain is X i and α j 's domain is Y j for i =1, 2,..., n and j =1, 2, ..., m. The fusion operation can be described under five different cases depending on the type of the variable to be deleted: Case 1. Suppose that D is a decision variable and D ∉ Y j for j =1, 2,..., m. Then the set of valuations after deleting D is
In words, after fusion, all the payoff valuations that bear on D are combined and marginalized such that D is eliminated. The other payoff valuations and all probability valuations remain unchanged.
Case 2. Suppose R is a chance variable and R ∉ X i for i = 1, 2, ..., n. Then the set of valua-
In words, after fusion, those probability valuations whose domain contains R are combined and marginalized such that R is eliminated. The other probability valuations and all the payoff valuations remain unchanged. Case 3. Suppose R is a chance variable and R ∈ X i for i =1, 2, ..., n. Then the set of valuations after deleting R is (π⊗α )
In words, after fusion, all payoff valuations and those probability valuations that bear on R are combined and marginalized such that R is eliminated. The other probability valuations remain unchanged. Case 4. Suppose R is a chance variable and only a part of the payoff valuations bear on R. Then the set of valuations after deleting R is
In words, after fusion, the payoff and probability valuations that do not bear on R remain unchanged. A new probability valuation α ↓X-{R} and a new payoff valuation π are created.
Note that this is the only case divisions take place. If a problem has only one payoff valuation, then this case does not happen and divisions become unnecessary.
Case 5. Suppose D is a decision variable and there exists j such that D ∈ Y j . Then the set of valuations after deleting D is
Note that, since the deletion is in accordance with the precedence constraints, D is to be deleted whenever D is minimum. Therefore, D is minimum in Y j . The semantic condition of the precedence constraints dictates that α j is independent of D. Thus, α j ↓Y j − {D} is well defined by Equation 7.
Note that Case 5 is avoided in [Shenoy 1992b ], by adding a test in Case 4 to see whether a newly generated probability valuation is vacuous. If it is, then the fusion can be simplified as
This approach does not work for non-Markov decision problems as evidenced by θ in Table 7 . Even though it works for Markov decision problems, we feel that it is not efficient to add an extra test to Case 4.
COMPUTATIONAL ARCHITECTURE
Solving a decision problem is equivalent to deleting all the variables out of a valuation network using the fusion algorithm. The deletion sequence is in accordance with the precedence constraints. It starts with a minimal variable and then proceeds to the next minimal variable until all the variables are deleted. However, because > is a partial order, there may be multiple minimal variables at a certain step of deletion. The deletion sequence becomes non-unique. Then, do different deletion orders give the same solution? This section answers the question positively.
Lemma 1. Suppose π is a payoff valuation for X and R 1 and R 2 are chance variables in X. Then
(11) Lemma 2. Suppose π is a payoff valuation for X, and D 1 and D 2 are decision variables in X. Then
Lemma 3. Suppose α is a probability valuation of H given T, and R 1 and R 2 are two chance
Lemma 4. Suppose α is a probability valuation of H given T, and decision variables D 1 and D 2 belong to T and are minimal in X=H
The verification of the above four lemmas is straightforward by using Equations 6-9. The lemmas indicate that different orders of eliminating multiple chance variables or multiple decision variables do not affect the final result of the marginalization. Therefore, they extend the definitions of marginalization to the case of eliminating multiple variables. For example, suppose π is a payoff valuation for X and X 1 and X 2 are two variables in X. Then π ↓X − {X 1 , X 2 } is well defined with respect to the precedence order. Because > is a partial order, we have either X 1 > X 2 , or X 2 > X 1 , or X 1 ~ X 2 . The marginal π ↓X − {X 1 , X 2 } is well defined in the first two cases because X i is deleted after X j whenever X i > X j for i, j = 1, 2. In the case of X 1 ~ X 2 , X 1 and X 2 are either both decision variables or both chance variables according to the perfect recall condition. Then, by
Equations 11 and 12, the marginal π ↓X − {X 1 , X 2 } is the same no matter which order we take to delete X 1 and X 2 . Therefore, in all the cases, π ↓X − {X 1 , X 2 } is well defined. By induction, it is easy to infer that the marginal π ↓X − Y is well defined with respect to a precedence order for every subset
Suppose a valuation network has n payoff valuations π 1 , π 2 ,..., π n and m probability valuations α 1 , α 2 , ..., 
where Fus Z i {…} represents the set of valuations after the fusion operation of deleting Z i for i = 1, 2, ..., k. Equation 15 states that the marginal (π ⊗ α) ↓∅ can be obtained by applying the fusion algorithm and eliminating all the variables in a precedence order. The result implies the correctness of the fusion algorithm in solving coarse valuation networks.
ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we apply the fusion algorithm to the used car buyer's problem. First, as per the
{T, O, D, R, B, C}
Step 2. Since B is a decision variable and no probability valuations bear on B, Case 1 of the fusion algorithm applies. After the fusion, the probability valuation δ and the payoff valuations π and ρ remain unchanged. The payoff valuation ν is marginalized such that B is eliminated and a new payoff valuation ϕ = ν ↓{T, O, D, R} is generated (see Tables 5 and 6 ). Figure 3 shows the valuation network after deleting B. Step 3. According to Figure 3 , the payoff valuation ϕ bears on the chance variable R while π and ρ do not, Case 4 of the fusion algorithm applies. After the fusion, the new probability valua- Table 7 ). The other two payoff valuations π and ρ are unchanged. The valuation network after deleting R is shown in Figure 4 . Step 4. According to Figure 4 , the probability valuation θ bears on the decision variable D, Case 5 of the fusion algorithm applies. After the fusion, θ is reduced into η = θ ↓{T, O} . The payoff valuations ψ and ρ are combined and then marginalized into κ such that D is eliminated. The payoff valuation π remains unchanged. The numerical result is shown in Table 8 . After the deletion of D, the valuation network is shown in Figure 5 . η ↓T π λ
Step 6. According to Figure 6 , the probability valuation η ↓T bears on the decision variable T, Case 5 of the fusion algorithm applies. After the fusion, η ↓T is reduced into η ↓φ by using Equation
7
. The payoff valuations λ and π are combined and then marginalized into (λ ⊗ π) ↓φ such that T is eliminated. The numerical result is shown in Tables 5 and 6 , given T = t 2 , the optimal strategy is to buy the car without an anti-lemon guarantee (b 2 ) if the initial test t 2 does not find any errors and buy the car with an anti-lemon guarantee (b 1 ) if the initial test does find one or two defective systems. The optimal value for the problem is 32.89.
CONCLUSION
This research has made three contributions to existing work. First, it proposes the notion of coarse valuations that bridges the gap between Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and Bayesian theory of probability functions. It establishes the conditions, under which coarse valuations (and of course, belief functions) can be used for normative decision-making using the expected utility criterion. The notion of coarse valuations follows the semantics of evidential support. It avoids artificial priors in the Bayesian theory by representing partial indecisiveness using focal elements and complete ignorance using vacuous belief functions. In the meantime, it allows a compact model for probabilistic IF-THEN assertions. It can be shown that the rule of combining coarse valuations in Equation 4 includes as special cases both Dempster's rule of combination and the Bayesian rule of conditioning.
Second, it extends the framework of valuation networks to allow more flexible judgments of probabilities in modeling decision problems. An influence diagram allows only conditional probabilities. A valuation network was more flexible by allowing conditional as well as joint probabilities. This research shows that the valuation network also admits coarse valuations. To permit a solution to a valuation network using coarse valuations, this paper first stipulates certain conditions for the valuation network to follow. It then presents three basic operators to manipulate both probability and payoff valuations. It proposes a fusion algorithm and a computational architecture to solve a valuation network using coarse valuations. Finally, the fusion algorithm is illustrated using the used car buyer's problem.
Finally, and most importantly, this paper makes a contribution to the representation of asymmetric decision problems. Asymmetry is prevalent while symmetry is rare. To represent an asymmetric decision problem, both influence diagrams and valuation networks have to introduce dummy events and acts, and degenerate probabilities and utilities to make it symmetric. The symmetrization can explode the problem space by up to 90%, as illustrated by the used car buyer's problem. This is why influence diagrams still cannot replace decision trees as a dominating tool for decision analysis. This paper shows that coarse valuations are the most compact and natural representation of payoffs and uncertainties. They are even more expressive than a decision tree. As we have shown, a coarse valuation network can take full advantage of both conditional independence and numerical coalescence. On the other hand, because it lacks a mechanism to represent conditional independence, a decision tree can exploit conditional independence only if a causal relation coincides with the chronological order. Meanwhile, a decision tree can exploit numerical coalescence only when one branch of the tree is identical to another. The larger the problem space, the more calculation it requires. A comparison of computational efficiencies is important. However, because the three methods use different algorithms to solve problems, any comparison is naturally tied to their programmatically implementations. Here we only give an approximate magnitude to show the differences. For example, to delete the variable C in the used car buyer's problem, no matter which method we employ, we have to multiply the probability valuations α, β and γ. To do so, the decision tree method requires 64 multiplications. A symmetric influence diagrams with Bayesian probabilities requires 12,288 multiplications. The coarse valuation method requires 160 multiplications. Of course, both the decision tree method and the influence diagram method require additional divisions and multiplications to make Bayesian revisions complete. Also, if no special data structures are designed to avoid them, the coarse valuation method requires additional 160 set intersections.
Method

APPENDIX: COARSE PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENT
Let H and T be two disjoint sets of variables. Let (h | t) denote the logical assertion that the true H is in h if the true T is in t. Given any two logical assertions, (h 1 | t 1 ) and (h 2 | t 2 ), (h 1 | t 1 ) is stronger than (h 2 | t 2 ) if h 1 ⊂ h 2 and t 1 ∩ t 2 ≠ φ.
Based on the notion of evidential support [Shafer 1976 ], we can allocate to (h | t) a non-zero belief mass α(h | t) if there is a piece of evidence that partially supports (h | t). A piece of evidence in support of (h | t) does not automatically support any stronger propositions. Thus, α(h | t) cannot be re-allocated to any stronger propositions than (h | t). We call an assertion (h | t) focal if α(h | t) > 0. Correspondingly, we call h the focal head and t the focal tail.
Suppose α 1 and α 2 are two coarse probability functions of H given T. α 1 and α 2 are called equivalent and denoted by α 1 ~ α 2 , if for every focal element of α 1 , say ( h 1 | t 1 ), there exists a focal element of α 2 , say ( h 2 | t 2 ), such that t 1 ∩ t 2 ≠ φ, h 1 = h 2, and α 1 ( h 1 | t 1 ) = α 2 ( h 2 | t 2 ).
The notion of equivalence addresses the non-uniqueness of encoding the same piece of evidence. Suppose H and T are two binary zero-one variables and α 1 ({1} | {0,1}) = 0.9, α 1 ({0,1} | {0}) = 0.1, and α 1 ({0} | {1}) = 0.1. This coarse probability function can be equivalently represented as α 2 ({1} | {0}) = 0.9, α 2 ({1} | {1}) = 0.9, α 2 ({0,1} | {0}) = 0.1, and α 2 ({0} | {1}) = 0.1.
Note that α 1 ({1} | {0,1}) = 0.9 is decomposed into α 2 ({1} | {0}) = 0.9 and α 2 ({1} | {1}) = 0.9. They represent exactly the same belief. However, the former takes advantage of numerical coalescence, which is very important in representing an asymmetric Bayesian problem and reasoning problem, as we discussed in Section 3.
The equivalence relation ~ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Therefore, all equivalent coarse probability functions form a class. When modeling uncertainties using coarse probabilities, we cannot ensure the results are unique. However, we ensure that the different results, if any, are equivalent and belong to the same class.
In every class of coarse valuations, there is one member whose focal tails are all singletons. We call such a member the atomic function. For every coarse probability function with focal elements (h | t) and the mass function α, its equivalent atomic function has focal elements (h | t), where t ∈ t and the mass function α 0 (h | t) = α(h | t) if t ∈ t.
With the concepts of equivalence and atomic functions, we can formally stipulate the axioms of coarse probabilities. A basic probability assignment function α for H given T is a nonnegative, real-valued function α on logical assertions (h | t) such that its atomic equivalent α 0 satisfies the following: For any t ∈ Ω T , 0 ≤ α 0 (h | t) ≤ 1, α 0 (∅| t) = 0 ∑{α 0 (h | t) | h ⊂ Ω H } = 1 Bertele, U. and F. Brioschi (1972) , Nonserial Dynamic Programming, Academic Press, New York, NY. Bielza, C. and P. P. Shenoy (1999) , "A comparison of graphical techniques for asymmetric decision problems," Management Science, 45(11), 1552−1569.
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